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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the pattern, sources and growth of remittances to Pakistan. It analyses the growing trend 
of remittances and share of remittances to GDP over the period 1972-2014. We use the kinked exponential 
growth model (Boyce, 1986, 1987) to estimates the growing trend of remittances in Pakistan. The results show 
that remittances received by Pakistan have three distinct growth phases over the study period,    Phase-I (1973 
– 1983), Phase-II (1984 – 2000) and Phase-III (2001 – 2014). The remittances received by Pakistan have 
positive growth during the first and the third period while the second period shows negative growth. Before 
globalization, the UK was the major source of remittances to Pakistan but after globalization, the sources of 
remittances to Pakistan have been cantered on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Remittance is the income that migrants sent back to their homes. It is proved to be a major financial instrument 
for many people living around the world.  It is used globally to ease major or part of the financial burden by the 
family members left behind. Remittances are used as consumption, investment, insurance, and other financial 
purposes.  
Remittance flows have increased globally from US$ 582 to US$ 613 billion from 2015 to 2017 and are expected 
to grow and reach US$ 746 till 2020. From these amounts, the low-middle income countries received US$ 574 
billion, East Asia and Pacific received US$ 156 billion, the South-Asia received US$ 142 billion, Latin America 
and the Caribbean received US$ 95 billion, Sub-Saharan Africa received US$ 51 billion, Europe and Central 
Asia received US$ 64 billion and the Middle East and North Africa received US$ 66 billion. (Migration and 
Development Brief 31). 
The history of remittances to Pakistan is much falcate. The amount of remittances to Pakistan was less than 
one percent during the 1960s. In the seventies, remittances start growing and in 1973, Pakistan received 
around $136 million remittances which reached $ 14, 900 million in 2013.   Today Pakistani Diaspora around 
the world comprises over 9 million with an estimated 4 million the “circulating workforce” in the Persian Gulf 
region. These Pakistanis have remitted around US$19.3 billion in remittances in FY2017.  Remittances to 
Pakistan have different sources including the UAE, US, Saudi Arabia, GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
and Oman), Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and EU countries like Norway and Switzerland. Recently, the 
Government of Pakistan has started a project called “Pakistan Remittance Initiative” (PRI) to increase the 
amount of remittances to Pakistan. 
According to the State Bank of Pakistan, more than 80% of remittances to Pakistan come from North America, 
the Persian Gulf, and Europe alone. From 1970 to 2003, foreign remittance proved to be the third most 
significant source of capital in the way of Pakistan’s macroeconomic growth. But it is unfortunate that Pakistan, 
like other developing countries, has failed to use the inflow of remittances, and other financial flows to their own 
best advantage.  Pakistan is unable to use these financial resources efficiently to generate a developmental 
momentum. Pakistan has been facing a serious scarcity of foreign exchange and remittances can fill this gap. 
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Remittances can provide the much needed financial resources required by Pakistan for the structural changes 
in the economy.  Remittances also helped in reducing the constant deficit in the Balance of Payment.    
This study is a simple attempt to analyze the pattern and sources of remittances over a period of more than 
forty years (1973-2014). It is undeniable fact that during the early years of development, a larger inflow of 
remittances to Pakistan assists to minimize the problem of foreign exchange crisis and variability in the 
exchange rate impact on different macrocosmic variables. There may be two reasons for the immense increase 
in remittance payments over the years. First, during 1970, migration increased and second, the cost of sending 
money has declined due to technological advancement (Guiliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2006).    
If we look at the year-wise receipts of remittances to Pakistan, it is observed that there are three clear distinct 
phases – Phase-I, (1976 to 1983), Phase-II (1984 to 2000) and finally Phase-III (2000 onwards). Phase-I and 
phase-III is characterized by a steady growth of both, the absolute value of remittances and percentage share 
of remittances to GDP while a sharp decline in both the variables during Phase-II (Figures 1 and 2). 
Pakistan is among the top ten remittances receiving country so the study of pattern and behavior of remittance 
is important and allow policymakers to make better policy decisions toward the utilization of remittances.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Many studies discussed the welfare and growth effects of remittances; like Ziesemer  (2006), Fajnzylber, Pablo, 
and Humberto Lopez (2007), and Bhaskara Rao and Gazi Hassan, (2009) while numerous studies linked 
remittances to employment pattern (Anwar, 2004), income inequality (Oded Stark, J. Edward Taylor and, 
Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1986), an exchange rate (Frenkel and Mussa, 1985), schooling decision (Dietz, Gatskova, 
Ivlevs, 2015). 
Khattak (2013) classified the remittances into two major categories: (i) Ideas and changing outlook coming into 
a country, (ii) Physical goods and cash. This study also observed that there is a strong and stable underlying 
association between foreign remittances, household consumption, savings and investment in the country.  
Though the impact of the flow of remittance on Pakistan’s economic growth has not been proven and some 
researchers have still based their arguments over whatever little data they found on the macroeconomic effects 
of remittance of the economy. Richard and Adams (1998) find that deficit in the current account and balance of 
payments reduced significantly by remittances coming from the Middle East and Europe. Iqbal and Sattar 
(2005) analyzed the macroeconomic importance of foreign remittance for the economy of Pakistan and argue 
that remittance income is considered as an injection of resources into a country’s economy. 
Amjad et. al., (2013) categorizes the remittance market according to official and unofficial channels and 
observed that Pakistan has been experiencing a favorable increase in the flow of remittances, particularly those 
received from official channels. This study also confirms that countries where financial systems are weak, 
remittance provides the best alternative to control liquidity issues.  
Richard H. Adams and Jr. John Page (2005) conclude that remittances significantly strike down the level of 
poverty and reduce its severity. Nishat and Bilgrami (1991) employed a Keynesian structural model to analyze 
and make an accurate estimation of remittances multiplier. They concluded that remittances and investment, 
imports and consumption have a positive relationship. 
On the microeconomics side, many studies link the remittances with poverty and income inequality like Khan 
(2014) observed that the size of the household has a direct relation with poverty and inequality. For example, 
a household with a large number of people living together amongst which the working adults are only a few 
tends to have higher poverty than households with fewer members and more at-work adults. On the other hand, 
Hasan (1998) and Faheem (2010) argue that those households who receive remittance regularly have an 18.4 
percent marginal probability of falling below the poverty line in comparison to those who do not.  
Although there is a huge literature on remittance-growth nexus, remittance’s role to improve economic growth 
is still imprecise. Many studies found a positive association (Pradhan et al. 2008, Ziesemer 2006) while many 
studies found a negative association (Barajas et al. 2009, Rajan and Subramaniam 2005) between remittance 
and growth. So the present literature about the relationship between remittances and economic growth has 
contradictory findings. Pakistan is among the top ten remittances receiving country so the study of sources, 
pattern, and behavior of remittance is important and allows policymakers to make some better decisions toward 
the utilization of remittances.                                                                          
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3. METHODS  
We collected the time series data from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and measure the percentages and point-to-point growth rates. The whole period is divided into three 
specific sub-periods. 
 
For measuring the growth rates we use the simple linear exponential growth mode 
                                                                       tt
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                                                                      (1) 
The general form of the kinked exponential model for m sub-periods and 1m kinks (k) is(𝑘1, 𝑘2, … … … … 𝑘𝑚−1). 
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The equation (4) shows the generalized kinked exponential model. This model is broken, in case of time series 
data, at two points   (i.e. the entire time series is sub-divided into three sub-periods) is given as 
       
                             ln 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑎1𝐷1 + 𝑎2𝐷2 + 𝑎3𝐷3 + (𝑏1𝐷1 + 𝑏2𝐷2 + 𝑏3𝐷3) 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                      (5) 
This is, however, the unrestricted (discontinuous) model. The growth rates estimated from the above equation 
( ) are the same as if separate exponential trends were fitted independently in each sub-period. However, when 
applying linear restrictions in such a way that sub-period trend lines meet at, the kinked exponential model 
becomes, 
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Coefficients,   and are growth rates of three sub-periods obtained by OLS estimation. 
 
A modified version of the kinked exponential model has been used for testing the statistical significance.  The 
modified version is 
            tt
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Where 
   
 
*
1b = the difference between first and second sub-period growth rates 
*
2b = the difference between third and second sub-period growth rates. 
 
This entire period is divided into three phases so, the first and second kinks occur at the 9th and 25th years of 
the study. 
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
The remittances to Pakistan have different sources. The percentage share of remittances coming from different 
sources to Pakistan is calculated and the table (1) shows that in the seventies, more than half of the country’s 
total remittances were coming from the United Kingdom (UK) alone. Oman was the second most important 
country after the UK followed by the United States of America and Saudi Arabia. 
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But this situation has changed in the 1980s and Saudi Arabia became the most important source of remittances. 
Pakistan received around 45.53 percentages of remittances from Saudi Arabia in 1980 while during the same 
period the percentage share of remittances declined to 8.57 percentages from the UK.   
Table 1. Relative importance of Pakistan’s remittances 
  Source: Author’s Calculation 
In the decade of the 1990s, the United States once again regains its position and in 1991, remittances coming 
from the USA have increased to 10.29 percentages. This increase continued in the subsequent decade and 
Item FY73 % FY80 % FY91 % FY01 % FY2014 % 
I. Cash Flow 136.00 100.00 1,747.05 100.00 1,626.92 88.02 1021.59 94.019713 15837.68 99.999811 
 1 
USA 
9.98 7.34 61.47 3.52 190.23 10.29 134.81 12.406932 2467.65 15.580851 
 2 
U.K. 
72.13 53.04 149.72 8.57 180.05 9.74 81.39 7.4905436 2180.23 13.766068 
 3 
Saudi Arabia 
7.87 5.79 795.46 45.53 681.97 36.90 304.43 28.017523 4729.43 29.86183 
 4 
U.A.E. 
0.00 0.00 216.80 12.41 172.03 9.31 190.04 17.489899 3109.52 19.633647 
  
Dubai 
0.00 0.00 86.87 4.97 68.72 3.72 129.69 11.935724 1550.03 9.7869578 
  
Abu Dhabi 
0.00 0.00 105.00 6.01 75.71 4.10 48.11 4.4276945 1512.45 9.5496761 
  
Sharjah 
0.00 0.00 24.93 1.43 27.60 1.49 12.21 1.1237196 45.54 0.2875416 
  
Others 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.002761 1.5 0.0094711 
 5 
Other GCC  
23.87 17.55 281.45 16.11 151.57 8.20 198.75 18.291504 1860.03 11.744312 
  
Bahrain 
2.46 1.81 33.04 1.89 37.20 2.01 23.87 2.1968212 318.84 2.0131698 
  
Kuwait 
7.04 5.18 111.64 6.39 15.12 0.82 123.39 11.355918 681.43 4.3025791 
  
Qatar 
2.17 1.60 63.20 3.62 24.27 1.31 13.38 1.2313979 329.24 2.0788359 
  
Oman 
12.20 8.97 73.57 4.21 74.98 4.06 38.11 3.5073672 530.52 3.3497267 
 6 
EU Countries 
1.80 1.32 69.60 3.98 32.62 1.76 21.5 1.9787036 431.85 2.72672 
  
Germany West 
1.32 0.97 57.29 3.28 32.62 1.76 9.2 0.8467011 85.58 0.5403559 
  
France 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.22 0.2043127 34.39 0.21714 
  
Netherland 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.6 0.3313178 4.24 0.0267715 
  
Spain 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.005522 79.83 0.5040501 
  
Italy 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.050618 33.25 0.209942 
  
Greece 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 14.88 0.093953 
  
Sweden 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.0681042 14.89 0.0940161 
  
Denmark 
0.48 0.35 12.31 0.70 0.00 0.00 3.83 0.3524853 23.7 0.1496428 
  
Ireland 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.2 0.0184065 137.6 0.8688125 
  
Belgium 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.1 0.101236 3.49 0.022036 
 7 
Norway 
0.67 0.49 14.46 0.83 21.28 1.15 5.74 0.5282679 30.77 0.1942831 
 8 
Switzerland 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.24 0.3902188 29.42 0.1857592 
 9 
Australia 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.15 0.3819358 159.59 1.0076583 
 10 
Canada 
2.12 1.56 7.33 0.42 11.26 0.61 4.9 0.4509604 160.03 1.0104365 
 11 
Japan 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.93 0.3616886 7.09 0.0447666 
 12 
Others Countries 
17.56 12.91 150.76 8.63 185.91 10.06 67.71 6.2315359 672.07 4.2434796 
II. 
Encashment and Profit in 
Pak.Rs. of Foreign 
Exchange Bearer 
Certificates (FEBCs) & 
Foreign Currency Bearer 
Certificates (FCBCs) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 221.37 11.98 64.98 5.9802866 0.03 0.0001894 
Total (I+II) 136.00 100.00 1,747.05 100.00 1,848.29 100.00 1086.57 100 15837.71 100 
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reached 15.58 percentages in 2014. The remittance percentage from UAE and Saudi Arabia reached 19.63 
percentages and 19.63 percentages during 2014 respectively. It has also been observed that the relative 
importance of other Gulf countries has increased steadily during the subsequent periods. The importance of 
European Union countries as sources for remittance to Pakistan has remained the same during the same 
period.   
The absolute value (measured at constant prices after deflating the series) of the remittances has three distinct 
periods as shown in figure 1. The first phase (1973 to 1983) shows the steady growth of the number of 
remittances. The second period (1984 to 2000) shows a falling amount of remittances and the third period 
(2001 – 2014) is again observed in the recovery stage of the amount of remittance. 
 
The percentage share of remittances to GDP as shown in figure 2 has a similar growth pattern as has seen in 
figure 1. To analyze the growths of remittances received by Pakistan from different sources and also its 
contribution to GDP, we have estimated the growth rates of these two variables for the three sub-periods by 
the kinked exponential method. The result is in table 2. 
Table 2. Sub-period growth rates of remittances, and share of remittances to GDP of Pakistan (1976-2014) 
Variable Kinked Exponential Growth Rate Trend Breaks R2 D.W. 
1973 -1983 1984 -2000 2001 -2014 First 
break 
Second 
break 
Remittances  
 
 
Share of  
remittances  
to GDP 
12.43* 
(3.265) 
 
9.16* 
(2.435) 
-13.50* 
(-7.906) 
 
-9.78* 
(-5.549) 
13.78* 
(6.182) 
 
10.60* 
(4.837) 
-25.93* 
(-5.225) 
 
-18.94* 
(-3.87) 
27.28* 
(7.777) 
 
20.39* 
(5.915) 
0.90 
 
 
0.81 
 
1.78 
 
 
1.77 
    Note: figures in the parentheses are the corresponding‘t’ values and ‘*’ significant at 1%.   
   Source: Author’s Calculation 
It is evident from the result that the first and third sub-periods witnessed a positive growth phase both in terms 
of total remittances received and the share of remittances to GDP. More specifically, during the first sub-period, 
the total remittances and its share to GDP witnessed annual growth rates of 12.43 and 9.16 percent 
respectively. However, the total remittances and its share to GDP became negative during the second sub-
period. After the globalization policy being implemented, the growth rates during 2001 and thereafter have 
regained their position strongly. So the respective growth rates achieved during the third sub-period were 13.78 
and 10.76 percent per annum.  It is also evident from the results that the difference between the decadal growth 
rates (which is technically called trend breaks) is also statistically significant. Thus, the policy of globalization 
happens to be fruitful for Pakistan in case of remittances. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study analyses the growing trend of remittances and share of remittances to GDP over the period 1972-
2014 by using the kinked exponential model (Boyce, 1986, 1987). The results confirm that remittances received 
by Pakistan have three distinct phases. The first phase is from 1973 to 1983, the second phase is from 1984 to 
2000 and the third phase is from 2001 to 2014. The remittances received by Pakistan have positive growth 
during the first and the third phase while the second phase shows negative growth. Further, before globalization, 
the UK was the major source of remittances but after globalization, the sources of remittances to Pakistan have 
been centered on Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other Gulf countries. 
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